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the pharmacology of 
addiction
gerald moore
The centrefold photo in a December 2014 issue of The New Scientist shows the 
head of an adolescent hooked up to the exhaustive array of wires and rubber tubes 
of an electroencephalographic monitor. As a technique for measuring neuronal 
activity, EEG is more habitually reserved for coma patients and epileptics, but, 
along with the offspring of many other anxious Chinese parents, the young man in 
question is being treated for something quite different. A resident at the Internet 
Addiction Treatment Centre based in Beijing’s Military General Hospital, his di-
agnosed excess of time spent online is dealt with in much the same way as heroin 
dependency: through a combination of abstinence, electroshock therapy and, ru-
mour has it, physical torture. His hi-tech headgear is offset by camouflage cloth-
ing, which hints at the centre’s “military-style activities, including exercise drills 
and the singing of patriotic songs.”1 Placing well-publicized cultural differences 
to one side, what might look like therapeutic overkill is perhaps understandable 
in a region whose South Korean neighbours have seen the virtual rearing of an 
infant-avatar lead to the death of a real-life baby from neglect, in 2010; and where 
an epidemic of internet abuse is deemed symptomatic, if not also causal, of the 
phenomenon of acute social withdrawal that the Japanese term hikikomori. But 
similar stories are also emerging from the US and Europe—of the Oklahoma 
couple, for example, whose daughter starved while they played Second Life—to 
say nothing of the mounting evidence of diminished concentration and harmful 
sleep-deprivation among adults who, placing themselves at considerable risk of 
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disturbed mental health, obesity and heart-disease, now spend more time per day 
on media devices than they do asleep.2 In addition to extreme pathological cases, 
there is concern that we are witnessing a society-wide shift in our mean levels of 
attention, brought about by digital subjects’ increased craving for the constant 
stimulus of our technological devices.3 And there is further concern over the eco-
logical circumstances that are leading us to consume in the first place. It isn’t just 
a question of technologies of cognitive and affective overload, but of the anxio-
genic, dislocated environments in which the toxicity of addiction is exploited as a 
kind of anxiolytic cure. Addiction practitioners have spoken of an “addictogenic 
society”4 inseparable from industries seemingly intent on creating “addiction by 
design.”5 More recently, I have suggested “dopamining” as the name for an eco-
nomic model that both targets the extraction of dopamine and simultaneously 
creates a social instability that underpins pathological forms of consumption.6
The emergence of digital addiction within the context of a broader phenomenon 
of “generalized addiction” has been of particular interest to the French philoso-
pher of technology, Bernard Stiegler, a vociferous critic of our exploitation by 
consumer technologies that, by seizing hold of our attention, leave us affectively 
exhausted.7 The symptoms of what he diagnoses as a “crisis of attention” include 
not just spiralling rates of attentional deficiency, but the global pandemic of de-
pression and even the 2008 financial crisis, read as the apotheosis of postmoder-
nity’s addiction to short-termist thrill-seeking.8 Drawing heavily on anecdote and 
a “libidinal economic” theory of desire still grounded in a somewhat metaphysi-
cal, Freudian, language of “drives,” Stiegler himself provides sparse hard evidence 
for these claims, thus doing little to dilute his reputation as a nostalgic conser-
vative and excitable panic merchant.9 His position nonetheless finds substantial 
corroboration in a growing body of evidence on the transformative effects of pro-
longed immersion in restricted-focus environments, most notably in an emerging 
critique of the dominant “disease model” of addiction treatment, which draws on 
research into brain plasticity and the relation of addiction to social exclusion to 
reject the identification of dependence with genetic susceptibility and the specific 
properties of a highly politicized range of narcotics. We can combine this work on 
the ecology of addiction with Stiegler’s interest in the idea that the biological or-
ganism is “reinvented” through the technical objects that make up culture. More 
specifically, his occasional, allusive, comments on the neurology of experiential 
learning, offer an argument that the dopamine system, so inextricably bound 
up with addiction, is also the interface through which the neurocircuitry of the 
brain is organised by the tools, or artificial organs, that condition the physiologi-
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cal body. This, in turn, becomes the basis for establishing a relationship between 
our technological environments and addiction, understood as an adaptive state of 
interiority corresponding to, and produced by, social breakdown. 
Stiegler’s account of the construction of desire through technics, shares with the 
nascent neuro- and sociological approaches to addiction not just a diagnosis, but 
also a vision for therapy based on creating alternatives to the “proletarianizing,” or 
“dislocated” environments in which addiction takes hold. His argument that de-
sire is a product of the tools one uses to construct oneself a future anticipates the 
focus of contemporary neuroscience on the creation of “alternative reinforcers”10 
and perspectives that enable addicts to “realign desire,” by expanding the “nar-
rowing tunnel of attention” beyond the “immediate relief” of consumption.11 Un-
derwriting Stiegler’s position is his theory and logic of the pharmakon, “the cure 
that is also the poison.”12 This is not the pharmacology of the pharmaceutical 
and rehab industries, whose mass-production of consumable, commodified treat-
ments risks counterproductively facilitating the indiscriminate disavowal of our 
underlying symptoms, while simultaneously locking us into ever more restric-
tive patterns of use. It refers, rather, to the idea that the issues arising from the 
prevailing technological culture can be mitigated and overturned through the re-
organisation of the tools and techniques of entrapment to create ways out of an 
impasse.
ADDICTION AND THE PHARMAKON
The addictions supported and induced by all manner of pharmaka—kinds 
of fetish and writing, technics in general qua supplements in general—
form a logic of the supplement that is transformed over the course of the 
history of the supplement, in which the forces that shape libidinal econo-
my are also transformed, and in which addictions are the supports of the 
games of mutual dependence through which humans are linked, starting 
with love—the highest form of addiction. In other words, addictions are 
the concretization of the process of adoption in which psychic, collective 
and technical individuation consist.13 
Stiegler’s conception of the pharmakon is Platonic in origin, inherited from The 
Phaedrus, a text ostensibly on the nature of love, but which since Derrida’s Dis-
semination (1972) has been read predominantly in terms of its ending on the in-
toxication of writing. Composed around 370 BCE, at around the time of The Re-
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public, the dialogue begins with Socrates encountering the eponymous Phaedrus 
on his way to the country. Phaedrus is concealing something in his cloak and the 
philosopher rightly guesses that it is the written text of a speech on love (228d), 
which his companion confesses he is off to reread and consume to excess in pri-
vate, beyond the admonishing gaze of Athens’s elders.14 Although famed for never 
venturing beyond the Athenian walls (230d), Socrates announces that Phaedrus 
has “found a potion to charm me into leaving” society behind, and which he’ll 
pursue like a hungry animal until he gets his fix (230d). In a series of claims that 
are complicated by his penchant for irony, Socrates declares himself “sick with a 
passion for hearing speeches” (228b) and roused into a “frenzy” at the prospect 
of the text (234d). The language of pathology becomes more pronounced over the 
course of the ensuing conversation, in which the visceral experience of love—be 
it for people or physical objects—is portrayed as a sickness in the head (231d), a 
cause of rage, social withdrawal, bad judgement and loss of wealth (232c, 234b, 
252a). Socrates compares lovers to beggars (233e) and famously evokes cicadas as 
the legacy of people so entranced by music that they stopped eating and drink-
ing and died (259b-c). As the addiction psychologist Bruce K. Alexander has ob-
served of comparable passages in The Republic, “there can be little doubt” that 
such symptoms “are similar to contemporary depictions of severe addictions.”15 
The image of Socrates as craven nuances his frequent depiction as ascetic and ab-
stemious, exemplified perhaps most notably in The Symposium, where he plays the 
chaste master of desire to the addled and weak-willed Alcibiades (212e-214a). But 
in The Phaedrus he holds back from advocating complete abstinence. Despite his 
reputation for mistrusting writing, Plato makes a series of crucial distinctions be-
tween “slavish” love, experienced at the level of the bodily pleasure, and a higher 
love of the soul (258e); love for its own sake, fetishized as an end in itself, and love 
as a means to the end of truth. To each of these poles there corresponds a distinct 
kind of “madness,” the craving induced by addiction and the headiness of intoxi-
cation: “one produced by human illness, the other by a divinely inspired release 
from normally accepted behaviour” (265b). The kind of writing craved by Pha-
edrus—a text to be devoured for amusement and the thrill of its composition—
falls short of the writing that serves only as an instrument, a means of accessing 
“what is truly written in the soul” (277e-278e). Writing is thus not intrinsically 
bad or addictive, but a “pharmakon” (275a), toxic or redemptive, depending on 
whether it enslaves or liberates the body. The term means both “good and evil,” 
“remedy and poison,” but as Stiegler explains, commenting on The Phaedrus, “the 
pharmakon becomes a poison only when it provokes dependence.”16
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Stiegler complicates the alignment of toxicity and dependence, by stating that ad-
diction, too, is pharmacological. There are toxic and curative addictions, and our 
relationship with technics is moreover always one of addiction, in the sense that 
the life of the mind, or what Stiegler terms “spirit,” is constitutively dependent on 
the material, technical supports in which we are externalized. If the “noetic soul” 
is “addicted” to its technical objects, it is because technical objects are the supple-
ments without which it cannot exist, serving as the (“atranscendental”) condi-
tions of users’ horizons of expectation, attention and desire; hence the claim that 
“the great addiction, making all others possible, is spirit.”17 Socrates’ idea of “writ-
ing in the soul” thus becomes, for Stiegler, a literal statement about the way that 
the neuronal circuitry of the brain is continuously rewritten and organized by our 
technical prostheses.18
The groundwork for this idea is laid out in the Technics and Time series, in which 
technical objects are formulated as external memory supports, or ‘tertiary reten-
tions’ that generate “protentions,” causing consciousness to anticipate the fu-
tures that might be realized when we use tools to build artificial environments.19 
Stiegler’s subsequent work develops this into a theory not just of time, but of 
the unconscious, elaborating on Freud’s ideas on the plasticity of the libido and 
Winnicott’s work on “transitional objects” to argue that desire is created when 
we stand in an affective relation to possible futures that we are able to envis-
age through the adoption of tools that facilitate their realization. The experience 
of desire to which different tools give rise varies depending on the kind futures 
they enable us to project, and the extent to which these futures offer deferred 
or immediate, enduring or throwaway gratification.20 The formation of desire is 
characterized by addiction when adhesive libido attaches itself to pharmaka that 
generate rhythms and expectations of such immediate reward that the focus of 
attention becomes narrowly fixated on the present. The relation to a more dis-
tant future breaks down, locking the addict into a cycle of short-termist acquisi-
tion and despair.21 Strictly speaking, where automated craving dominates over the 
anticipation tied to the realisation of longer term projects, Stiegler argues that 
desire cannot even be formed. The latter only comes into existence when bio-
logical “drives” are “disautomated,” or “sublimated,” through “the differance of 
pleasure,” the deferral of quick hits of gratification for the sake of a more distant 
expectation of reward.22
The language of libidinal economy will inevitably make for consternation in the 
Freud-averse extended world of the harder sciences, but the argument translates 
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into the discourse of contemporary neurology. The most pertinent parallel is 
found in the brain’s dopamine system, which plays a decisive role in establishing 
horizons of anticipation and the motivation to realize them. The central compo-
nent of neural mechanisms of reward, the dopamine system is also fundamental 
to a biophysical version of Stiegler’s distinction between automatic drives and 
plastic desire, understood to differ, not in kind, but by degree, pertaining to short-
er and longer circuits in the iterations of libido. Dopamine doesn’t correspond 
directly to pleasure and the satisfaction of desire (“liking”), but rather to “want-
ing” and expectation.23 The evolutionary value of the dopamine system consists in 
it being the trigger that teaches and reminds us to eat and procreate, by attaching 
craving for repetition to memories of satiation and pleasure. The release of dopa-
mine into the nucleus accumbens, the part of the basal forebrain that controls mo-
tivation and goal-directed behaviour, coincides with the creation of new neuronal 
connections, which are reinforced by the anticipation of reward.24 Dopamine thus 
plays a constitutive role in our ability to form habits and learn from experience, 
influencing the kinds of protention that are attached to acquired behaviours. In 
a point that gains significance when paired with Stiegler’s claim that time is pro-
duced through technics, this rhythming of attention is thought to be a major com-
ponent in creating our sense of temporality.25
The addict is not hedonically motivated by a guaranteed access to pleasure, but, 
rewired by dopamine to crave the chemical’s continued release, joylessly con-
sumes in spite of a higher-order volition to go clean. The same pattern holds true 
for the tormented lover, who manifests all the symptoms of addiction. In its cura-
tive pharmacological dimension, love opens up alternative futures by automat-
ing new habits and transforming our horizons of expectation; Stiegler reads it in 
terms of a shared relation to the tools through which we construct a life that lifts 
us above mere adaptation to circumstance.26 When it turns toxic, the love-addict 
endures the same impossible choice between tortuous, destructive consumption 
or withdrawal sickness and the overwhelming disruption of everyday life. A toxic 
addiction would be one that entails a dehumanizing life lived in servitude to the 
objects that hijack the body, restricting us to regressive patterns of consumption 
as an end-in-itself. Both love and drug addiction trigger the flow of dopamine into 
the reward pathway of the brain and evidence links the neurotransmitter to all 
forms of experience associated with dependence, craving and repetitive urges.27 
In an essay that sketches out a systems-theoretical approach to addiction, “The 
Cybernetics of ‘Self ’: A Theory of Alcoholism” (1971), Gregory Bateson accounted 
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for the difficulty of renunciation by arguing that the alcoholic’s selfhood is not 
somehow independent of drink, but forms “only a small part of a much larger 
trial-and-error system” in which alcohol itself “does the thinking, acting, and 
deciding.”28 Stiegler reiterates this position, describing how technical objects 
bring about a function-shift in our physiological organs, transforming our field 
of experience. Just as the experiential coordinates of the drunk revolve around 
inebriation, those of one who lives through their smartphone will be mediated 
by the habituation of their eyes and hand to the touchscreen. In both instances, 
the pharmakon both emboldens and impairs decision-making in accordance with 
the curative and redemptive logic of pharmacology. This making and unmaking 
of habits amounts to a “defunctionalization and refunctionalization” of both the 
body and brain, which become adapted to the new objects of their attention. For 
the most part, Stiegler’s analysis is psychoanalytic in register. When limbs and 
senses forge new relations with technical instruments, “these organs no longer 
economize libido in the same manner,” which is to say: induce a shift in expecta-
tion, desire and attention.29 But the science of neuroplasticity, more familiar in 
the work of Catherine Malabou, is also at work in the background. The reinven-
tion of the body through new tools coincides with a “reorganization of the cortex” 
and the “formation of neuronal circuits,” the creation of synaptic relations that 
these tools “literally inscribe . . . into the cerebral organ.”30 Although Stiegler does 
not refer to it himself, the dopamine system is at the heart of this process of in-
scription. It occupies a privileged position within the circuitry of what he terms 
“general organology,” a concept that encompasses the relations between physi-
ological organs, artificial organs (technical objects, pharmaka) and the cultural 
organisations that govern how our technical prostheses get used.31 In the sense of 
being both cure and poison, dopamine is itself a pharmakon, or at least, a funda-
mental physiological correlate and nexus through which technical organs de- and 
refunctionalize the body. 
PHARMACOLOGY OF THE DOPAMINE SYSTEM
Addiction is broadly understood as an “overwhelming involvement” with a pur-
suit that becomes detrimental to both society as a whole and to the individuals 
whose self-administration comes at the expense of other (professional, familial, 
social) activities.32 There is widespread recognition of its multiform causes, which 
comprise varying (and debated) degrees of genetic susceptibility plus environ-
mental factors, such as poverty, trauma, and access to addictive substances.33 The 
dominant approach among specialists narrows this down, locating the addict’s 
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problems in “a primary, chronic disease of brain reward, motivation, memory and 
related circuitry,”34 characterized by a fault in the dopamine system of neurotrans-
mission, which is to say, in the parts of the brain that establish communication 
between past experience and future decision-making. The dominance of this “dis-
ease model” of addiction is exemplified by the central role it plays, for example, 
in the treatment ethos of Alcoholics Anonymous, whose prescription of complete 
abstinence is underpinned by a presumed link between uncontrollable cravings 
and structural changes in the wiring of the brain, supposedly induced by substanc-
es with virtus dormitva-type addictive properties.35 The changes in brain chemis-
try are what account for the classical etiological distinctions between “physical,” 
“substance dependences” and the mere “psychological” cravings still frequently 
deemed to pertain to everything else.36 Yet emerging evidence points to “strong 
neural similarities” that effectively deconstruct the distinction—in the Derridean 
sense of undoing a supposedly rigid binary—between “physical” and “psychologi-
cal” addiction, and in so doing undermine the basis of the disease model.37 It is 
increasingly recognized that “every experience that has potent emotional content 
changes the NAC [nucleus accumbens] and its uptake of dopamine,”38 meaning that 
the dopamine system can be programmed by technology just as much as Class A 
drugs: “Video games, like Internet porn, meet all the conditions for plastic brain 
map changes,” with users manifesting typical symptoms of disavowal, craving, 
neglect of other activities and withdrawal, as well as a diminished capacity for at-
tention.39 Experimental measurements, for instance, connect computer games to 
increased craving for high levels of sensory stimulus, which leaves gamers more 
easily distractible in less immersive environments. Korean and Taiwanese studies 
suggest that half of children addicted to internet gaming qualify for diagnoses of 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), and where 18% of 15-23 year-
old students classed as internet-addicted showed symptoms strongly linked to 
ADHD. Debates persist over whether correlation entails causality, which is to say, 
whether those with ADHD are more susceptible to the freely available addictive 
games, or whether the technology itself is a cause of the addiction. The alternative 
is not that “one is causing the other, but that both are symptomatic of the same 
single common brain state: two sides of the same mental coin.”40
At its best, one might say, dopamine serves as an expression of the plasticity that, 
in anthropological terms, makes us distinctively human, by furnishing the mecha-
nism through which the acquired experience of the past generates expectations 
and anticipation of the future. At its worst, however, “excessive associative learn-
ing” means that we habituate ourselves to the expectation of a reward that is not 
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forthcoming, giving rise to a vicious circle, by desensitizing the reward circuitry of 
the brain to the point where we need more and more to achieve the same effect.41 
The dopamine system becomes saturated in such a way that only the addict’s 
drug of choice triggers the chemical’s release. As the synaptic pathways that fire 
in response to the object of addiction are reinforced, other pathways in the pre-
frontal cortex weaken and are “pruned” away, further narrowing the horizons of 
attention and leaving us unable to form new connections, envisage possibilities of 
desire, that could counteract the tightening grip of the neurotransmitter.42 We are 
locked into a dehumanizing spiral, where constant craving leaves us incapable of 
experiential learning, unable to imagine alternative futures. The use of the term 
“dehumanizing” is not incidental, here: neuroplasticity is far greater in Homo sapi-
ens than in chimpanzees and other mammals, who can generate only a fraction of 
our neural connections.43 Research also shows that rats and primates, with their 
smaller frontal lobes in the cerebral cortex, lack the specific (D2) dopamine re-
ceptors that constitute a highly developed “Stop impulse” in (non-adolescent) 
humans. This “Stop impulse,” which has been described as “the voice of reason,” 
is precisely what is compromised when dopamine-induced cravings short-circuit 
our ability to project horizons of expectation.44 Lewis explicitly equates this short-
circuiting with a regression to child-like behaviours and “constellations” of neuro-
nal wiring “more typical of kids than adults.” In the absence of (pruned) synaptic 
connections that would enable the switching of attention away from cravings, the 
addict falls back on “primitive” and “childish,” affectively exhausting, attempts to 
suppress their inclinations, the end result of which is “ego fatigue,” or the deple-
tion of the capacity for self-control.45 The same language of immaturation and 
dehumanization is used by Stiegler, who writes of our infantilization by a society 
organized around advertising’s prescription of consumption. 
The second chapter of Marcel Mauss and Henri Hubert’s classic, Sacrifice: Its Na-
ture and Function (1899), offers a detailed description of various rituals through 
which the (hitherto profane) participants, site and instruments of sacrifice are 
performatively cleansed, elevated to the status of the sacred, by the adoption of 
specific clothes and instruments that that keep sacrifice distinct from murder. 
Sacrificial blades are either stored in special cells, withdrawn from any contact 
with the unpurged, or manufactured anew for each occasion and jettisoned—for 
example, thrown into the sea—as soon as a sanctioned killing has taken place.46 
Similar accounts from Detienne and Assoun, among others, confirm that the func-
tion of such ritual is to enact the sacredness of a fetishized object, preventing its 
collapse back into profanation.47 The Stieglerian argument is that such sacrificial 
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rituals have now given way to a reversal in which marketing prescribes what was 
once proscribed: the fetishized technical object is no longer kept at a safe distance 
to mitigate misuse, but relentlessly presented for a consumption we cannot re-
fuse.48 The organisation of society now falls to rituals of commerce explicitly tar-
geted at the reward systems of the brain, with the intention of getting consumers 
deleteriously hooked on the high-stimulation, immediate gratification they prom-
ise. We are continually bombarded with the injunction to consume by advertisers 
who, fetishizing the curative aspect of pharmaka with minimal concession to their 
toxicity, compete for consumers’ “brain availability” (temps de cerveau disponible) 
and reduce self-control to an afterthought of small print.49 The ways in which we 
employ our consumer technologies are moreover predominantly determined by 
similar forms of prescription, notably proprietorial modes of use that limit our ar-
tefactually constructed horizons of expectation to preprogrammed pathways set 
in place by manufacturers. The “vast subservience of individuals to apparatuses” 
of consumerism “induces regression to minority,” the decomposition of the de-
ferred pleasure of desire into the servicing of short-termist, compulsive drives.50
In a formulation rendered problematic by its suggestion of a passage, or “subli-
mation,” of animal automation into rational desire and “desublimating” return to 
animality, but which is perhaps lent a measure of credence by the less developed 
plasticity and resistance to compulsion of other species that have been studied, 
Stiegler describes this regression as “bestialization.”51 We are “bestialized” when 
locked into restrictive environments that provide “no alternative” to consump-
tion and idiocy (“la betise”). Echoing Andy Clark’s claim that “environmental engi-
neering is also self-engineering,”52 Stiegler identifies a major factor in the genesis 
of addiction as manufactured cultural environments that privilege what Graeber 
would call systemic “structural stupidity,” referring to conditions that actively 
curtail the imaginative labour of those who are confined to them.53 Bestialization 
is thus synonymous with what Marx called “proletarianization,” a concept that 
Stiegler reworks to denote a situation of structural imbalance. The mutual con-
stitution of the who and the what, the subject and the technical object, becomes 
massively skewed towards users using tools to consume but not to produce. The 
kinds of “proletarianizing” technologies privileged by consumerism and the cul-
tural rules that govern their adoption mean that the tools through which we in-
terface with the world reinvent us, adapting us to them, without us being able 
to employ them for active self- and environmental transformation. The effect of 
repeatedly bombarding the senses with the high-intensity, monocultural stimuli 
of our desk-bound, screen-enthralled existences is to leave the brain profoundly 
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lacking in what Stiegler and I have termed “noodiversity,”54 and Warren Neidich 
“epigenetic, neural biodiversity,”55 referring to the variety and vitality internalized 
by and reproduced in the life of the mind. Cognitive, consumer capitalism brings 
about a widespread “destruction of attention” and “a generalization and mutation 
of addiction,” meaning a diminution in the kinds of tools that foster the cura-
tive dimension of the pharmakon, and a proliferation of those that, by priming us 
for immediate gratification, short-circuit the deferral of pleasure through which 
drives are sublimated into desire.56 Reworked through the discourse of the new 
addiction sciences, where addiction is less a disease than the side-effect of a plas-
tic brain that reshapes to fit its environments, we might say that the homogeniza-
tion of cultural stimulus goes hand-in-hand with the neural-Darwinian pruning 
of pathways no longer activated by our technological milieus. Focused around 
industrialized dopamining, or the constant triggering of dopamine hits, coupled 
with locked in, passivified consumption without production, the narrowing diver-
sity of our technological diet gives rise to a negative feedback loop in which we 
lose the very diversity of neuronal relations that could enable us to envisage and 
create alternative futures. 
In saying this, Stiegler’s pharmacological approach intersects not only with neu-
roscientific work on the plasticity of the dopamine system. It also lends itself to 
research that downplays the significance of dopamine, in favour of focusing on 
the relationship between addiction and contextual dependence. This line of argu-
ment suggests that toxic forms of addiction should be understood less in terms 
of chemical changes in the brain than in terms of the environments that occasion 
their use. According to its logic, we take drugs to escape from surrounding misery 
and it is the misery rather than the drugs that traps; the latter, for the most part, 
only exacerbate the entrapment of the former.57
POVERTY OF SPIRIT
At the end of the twentieth century, the capitalist way of life has become 
an addictive process that is decreasingly capable of bringing satisfaction, 
leading to a widespread malaise in the consumption that has replaced cul-
ture.58 
Routinely invoked to justify the “War on Drugs,” received wisdom on the dan-
gers of addiction tends to draw on now legendary stories of clinical experiments 
in which lab rats and monkeys repeatedly self-administer cocaine and heroin to 
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the point of oblivion. The findings have long been presented as proof of the in-
trinsically addictive properties of narcotics, with researchers paying little atten-
tion to the stressful circumstances in which the animals recourse to intoxication. 
But subsequent experiments have demonstrated that the rats disautomate their 
behaviours when housed in more sociable environments. When provided with 
other rats and play activities to keep them occupied in Bruce K. Alexander’s “Rat 
Park” experiments, the drugs become dramatically less attractive.59 The so-called 
“spontaneous remission” of the inhabitants of “Rat Park” mirrors the behaviour 
of American soldiers returning from Vietnam, whose heavy consumption of readi-
ly available, high-grade heroin amid the fog and stress of war never translated into 
a much feared crisis of addiction upon their return home, when only 10% con-
tinued to abuse.60 It also fits with evidence that between 50-80% of addicts will 
stop using voluntarily, without the need for professional intervention.61 The evi-
dence that environmental change leads to behavioural disautomation lends itself 
to what Alexander calls the “dislocation” theory of addiction. This theory casts 
addiction as an understandable and moreover “adaptive” response to the demor-
alising, alienating effects of community breakdown, or the “poverty of spirit” that 
comes about when “society systematically curtails psychosocial integration in all 
of its members.”62
Returning to Ancient Greece, Alexander suggests that the Socratic ethics of “self-
control,” meaning the reigning in of appetitive desire and ‘weakness of the will’ 
(247d, 250b), should be read in the context of a putative prevalence of addiction 
in Athenian society, which can itself be traced to the violent upheavals of the 
time, namely the decline of the golden age of democracy and slide into tyranny 
that came off the back of the Peloponnesian Wars of 431-403BCE.63 The image he 
paints is in keeping with others’ descriptions of toils of war that left the demos 
susceptible to demagogy and commercial interests, effectively excluding citizens 
from political decision-making. They reacted to this exclusion by further with-
drawing from the generational family structures that organized the polis. Tradi-
tionally obligatory and highly regimented communal meals (syssitia), intolerant 
of drunkenness, increasingly gave way to debauched private clubs hosting sym-
posia—the drinking parties from which Plato’s other famous critique of physical 
love takes its name.64 Eric Havelock situates this dramatic shift in social organisa-
tion in terms of the transition from oral to written society. Prior to the invention 
of writing, he argues, Athens had been a rigidly hierarchical culture based on the 
disciplined rote-memorisation of poetry, in which oral poems served as a vehicle 
for the transmission and learning of unwritten laws. As writing grew in popular-
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ity over the course of the fifth century, the increasing ability and temptation to 
rely on written texts entailed the perceived loss of discipline and a rise in the use 
of text for social criticism, which exacerbated the loosening hold of traditional 
forms of authority over younger Athenians.65 With the advent of digital technolo-
gies, and in circumstances exacerbated by the liquid society of capitalism, we are 
living through an analogous transformation between social-technical systems, 
and a corresponding spike in addictive behaviours. This time, it is not writing 
and alcohol that escape attempts at social moderation, but consumption as such, 
comprising everything from sugary fast food and gambling to technological gad-
gets that offer an escape from the entrapment of everyday life. 
Comparing Athens to the present, Alexander argues that contemporary Western 
society is characterized by a similar failure of “psychosocial integration,” in which 
shopping—and increasingly also religious fanaticism—serves as a “pseudosolu-
tion” to the experience of dislocation, filling the void left open by the sacrifice of 
community and meaningful employment to the creation of wealth.66 For Stiegler, 
the same set of circumstances mean that Alexander’s spiritual “poverty” has 
grown into a full-blown “crisis of spirit,” marked by systemic paralysis of par-
ticipation and social mobility and symptomatized by disaffection and a dulling 
of the senses that corresponds in turn to a “loss of the feeling of existence.”67 We 
have internalized the neoliberal ideology of TINA: “there is no alternative” but to 
adapt to the competitive, liquid environments forced on us by late capitalism.68 
It is in this context that consumption to the point of addiction becomes a short-
termist strategy of adaptation, dulling the pain of dislocation through “affective 
saturation” while holding open the dim prospect of redemption, to be eeked out 
through the castrated fantasies of one who cannot change the future, but who can 
buy fleeting moments of respite from the mundanity of the present and cling to 
the prospect of becoming heroic in some virtual world detached from this one. An-
ecdotal figures of over one million Japanese hikikomori, the predominantly male, 
younger members of society who withdraw from all forms of social interaction 
and spend their lives in their bedrooms, surfing the net and playing videogames, 
are offered up by Stiegler as evidence of this. He doesn’t acknowledge that both 
the figures and the link to addiction are disputed.69 The other evidence Stiegler 
cites for the impact of “generalized addiction” is similarly conspicuous in its spar-
sity, comprising a couple reports on the potentially deleterious relation between 
prolonged television exposure and the synaptic development of two-year-olds,70 
plus a short essay by a literary critic who has since distanced herself from the 
scale and political implication of his conclusions. 
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In that article, the seminal “Hyper and Deep Attention: The Generational Divide 
in Cognitive Modes” by N. Katherine Hayles, Hayles proposes that we are wit-
nessing a technologically-induced “generational shift” away from the “deep atten-
tion” of the age of the book, towards the “hyper attention” and “low tolerance for 
boredom” of digital natives.71 Her argument has become a constant reference for 
Stiegler,72 despite what Hayles dismisses rather hastily as his “broad condemna-
tions” of contemporary technology and corresponding disregard for the pedagog-
ical strategies she proposes as an antidote to attentional narrowing.73 He, too, per-
haps understates the extent to which Hayles anticipates his own pharmacological 
response to the effect of dramatic technological change on the impoverishment 
of spirit. Recognizing that “the dopamine cycle is not the whole story,” Hayles 
notes that video games succeed when the cravings they elicit are underwritten 
by gaming environments that facilitate “achievement, freedom, and in some in-
stances connections to other players even more satisfying than the fun of playing. 
Stimulation works best, in other words, when it is associated with feelings of au-
tonomy, competence, and relatedness.”74 Her comments converge with findings 
in the therapeutic field, which stress how the momentary oblivion of the addict 
negates the opposing experience of dependence, failure and disconnection. In us-
ing, the user withdraws from the toxicity of surrounding environments and finds 
respite from a “sense of overwhelming helplessness,” “the unbearable sensation that 
no options are available,” which addiction functions psychologically to reverse.75 
By way of partial illustration, the anthropologist Natasha Dow Schüll relates how 
gambling addicts enter into a pacific, trance-like union with the betting terminal, 
a “machine zone” where “the whole world is spinning around you, and you can’t 
really hear anything. You aren’t really there—you’re with the machine and that’s 
all you’re with.”76 Dopamine hits alleviate anxiety in the face of chaos. Withdrawal 
into gaming, shopping and social media is as much about avenues of escape that 
substitute for the frustrations of “bullshit jobs” and societal sclerosis. But when 
pharmaka open onto worlds that hold out the prospect of success elsewhere, the 
possibilities of harnessing them for environment-making and self-invention can 
trump the automated craving. 
For Stiegler and Hayles alike, the trick would be to reorganize technological cul-
ture in such a way that intermittently glimpsed moments of redemption trans-
late back into wider society, becoming a means for de-proletarianization, or par-
ticipation in, rather than exclusion from, the construction of symbolic order. A 
similar line of thought is at the heart of campaigns to decriminalize drugs, the 
aim of which is to lessen the vicious cycle of stigmatization and marginalization 
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that entrenches addicts in their social dislocation, by treating reintegration as a 
prelude to self-reinvention.77 The technological equivalent of decriminalization 
would be to replace an industrial model organized around the legal enshrinement 
of a hyperspecialized division of labour and the proprietary control over increas-
ingly narrow uses of technology with an “economy of contribution” that allows 
consumers to reinvent themselves as amateur participants in the design and con-
struction of an “ecology of spirit,”78 which is to say of pharmaka and technological 
environments that would facilitate self-care and a renewed focus on attention.79 
In place of a society of the dislocated and disaffected slumped in front of screens 
to anaesthetize the shock of relentless technological change, Stiegler envisages 
one of makers using the tools they have hitherto only consumed to experiment 
and produce new futures. To get there, he calls for a “politics of brains” to culti-
vate varied stimuli for the diversification of neuronal development and to over-
turn the monocultural diets on which we are feeding them.80 “Noodiversity will 
be the key issue over the next few decades, and this will require a noopolitics to 
operate above and below the emerging neuroindustry.”81
The search for what this would mean in practice is already under way in new ap-
proaches to addiction therapy, which increasingly take aim at the consumerism of 
the multibillion dollar “rehab industry.” In the eyes of more than one commenta-
tor, the latter is the very archetype of toxic consumer lock-in, based on the sale 
of a commodified cure, grounded more in the fetishization-effect of marketing 
than in medical science, which puts its success rate at just 5%.82 As Lewis puts it, 
“the definition of addiction as a disease, endorsed by the medical and scientific 
communities may be the most powerful marketing tool there is” for the purvey-
ors of institutionalized rehabilitation, but “probably does more harm than good 
for most addicts.”83 This is because of the way it reduces residents to passivified 
consumers, whose treatment depends exclusively on surrender to narrow modes 
of use prescribed by the rehabilitation environment. At the heart of the commer-
cial arm of the disease-model of addiction treatment is the renunciation of self-
control, the infamous surrender to a higher power so familiar from the Alcohol-
ics Anonymous twelve-steps programme. It works by treating addicts as sick, the 
hapless victims of some genetic misfortune, who can only be cured if they sub-
stitute one potentially unlimited consumption with another, namely the intermi-
nable stints of often oppressive, often luxurious, residential therapy, which users 
are encouraged to consume to excess not just when it works, but above all when 
it fails. The failure of rehab to curb addiction is routinely attributed to the failures 
of the addicts themselves, via the dogmatically repeated mantra that they lack the 
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desire to go clean, or have not yet reached the “rock bottom” point required to 
generate that desire. But this dogma omits to consider the structural role that re-
hab plays in the further proletarianization of addicts, who are required to submit 
to depersonalizing, institutional regimes of sobriety, and who accordingly “do not 
participate in decisions about their care.” While this standard therapeutic tech-
nique may spare inveterate users a degree of guilt, it nonetheless repeats the act 
of submission to the object of consumption, at the cost of preventing residents 
from developing techniques to transform themselves by taking control of their 
surroundings.84
CONCLUSION
There is a special kind of denial that is completely postmodern, something that 
only awareness of addiction ... can produce: the nondenial denial. It used to be 
that you’d actually say that you weren’t a drunk ... Nowadays you can’t get 
away with that; knowledge of the nature of dependency is too pervasive. So you 
start to have people like me, people who say, I am an addict and I like it, try and 
stop me.85
 
According to the writer and recovered junkie, Elizabeth Wurtzel, denial, once the 
hallmark of the addict’s unconscious guilt, has nowadays given way to the blithe 
recognition of dependence. Stiegler might seem to agree, here. He has argued that 
the desublimation of desire into craven drives coincides with the collapse of the 
social superego and the sense of shame it caused us to feel at the experience of 
desire.86 Consumerism’s relentless promotion of greed and short-circuiting of the 
prohibitions that, by deferring satisfaction, make desire possible, has given rise 
to a “monde sans vergogne,” a “world of shamelessness” and guilt-free consump-
tion (Stiegler 2005a). But one can qualify the apparent absence of affect by noting 
the role of addiction as a technique of disavowal for the momentary alleviation of 
guilt. Does disavowed disavowal thus become another symptom of an addiction-
addled culture? If so, it permeates right through to the science of addiction, de-
spite attempts to exonerate itself of complicity. Deliberating on the dissociative, 
detached sociality of young people, who over the last generation have exhibited “a 
dramatic decline in interest in other people,” and who “purpose-driven, plugged 
into their media, ... pay little attention to those around them,” the psychologist 
Sherry Turkle looks like a prime example of one who allows the unpalatability of 
presumed conclusions to justify a refusal to countenance the prospect that con-
sumer technologies might be addictogenic. Technology addiction is no more than 
206 · gerald moore  
metaphorical addiction, she insists, implicitly invoking the dubious, outdated, 
distinction between “real” addictions that induce chemical brain change and the 
mere “psychological” ones that don’t. 
But however apt the metaphor, we can ill afford the luxury of using it. 
Talking about addiction subverts our best thinking because it suggests 
that if there are problems, there is only one solution. To combat addiction, 
you have to discard the addicting substance. But we are not going to ‘get 
rid’ of the Internet. We will not go ‘cold turkey’ or forbid cell phones to 
our children. . . . The idea of addiction, with its one solution that we know 
we won’t take, makes us feel hopeless. We have to find a way to live with 
seductive technology and make it work to our purposes.87
For all her good intentions of wanting to avoid a dispiriting mass-stigmatization, 
Turkle’s aversion to a diagnosis of addiction rests on a distaste for what would 
be an absolutist and retrograde approach to addiction treatment, which sees ab-
stinence as the only cure for excess. The assumption of a stark choice between 
unregulated consumption and complete withdrawal repeats the exculpatory, ide-
ological—which is to say, naturalizing—mantra of the rehab industry: addiction 
is hardwired in nature and inescapable, rather than environmental, plastic and 
programmable. Stripped of alternatives, she is left with no choice but the classi-
cal disavowal of the addict who denies that there is a problem. Over and above a 
denial, Stiegler would also call it a “repression”—the repression of our originary 
technicity, of the way in which we are not “natural,” but constituted through and 
through by the artefactual pharmaka that inscribe second natures into the brain 
via the dopamine system.88 From the standpoint of Stieglerian pharmacology, the 
dichotomy Turkle sets up is a false one. The cure is not to jettison the pharmakon, 
but to cultivate its capacity for transformation. The same drug that, when con-
sumed in a toxic environment, further mires us in toxicity, can also enable us to 
project visions for environmental and self-transformation. The key for therapy, 
surely, is to build pharmaka that facilitate, rather than inhibit, the construction of 
alternatives.
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